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ALTRUISM AND AMBITION IN THE DYNAMIC MORAL LIFE 
Tom Dougherty 
Some people are such impressive altruists that they seem to us to already be doing more 
than enough. And yet they see themselves as compelled to do even more. Can our view 
be reconciled with theirs? Can a moderate view of beneficence’s demands be made 
consistent with a requirement to be ambitiously altruistic? I argue that a reconciliation 
is possible if we adopt a dynamic view of beneficence, which addresses the pattern that 
our altruism is required to take over time. This frees up theoretical space for 
understanding how a moral duty of self-development can intersect with the 
requirements of beneficence, so that the amount that we are required to sacrifice 
increases without our beneficence becoming immoderate. 
Keywords: Beneficence, partiality, demandingness, moral development, altruism, 
requirement. 
1. Introduction 
Consider Amy, who became disillusioned with her career as a corporate lawyer, and 
now helps make vaccines available in developing countries. As well as helping people in 
her career, she sets aside a generous portion of her salary towards charitable donations. 
There is more to her life than curing the world’s ills, though. She is supportive and 
loving of her family; keen on amateur dramatics, leisure and travel. Amy is not a saint, 
but she is still doing pretty well when it comes to altruism. Even so, she tries to increase 
how much she devotes to helping people in need. Amy is an ambitious altruist. But while 
her former law colleagues’ ambitions were driven by their preferences, Amy’s ambition 
is driven her conscience. As an affluent person in a world pervaded with poverty, she 
feels morally required to try to do better, even if she is already doing well. With respect 
to the sacrifices beneficence requires her to make of her resources—her time, money, 
effort, and anything else that she values—Amy accepts the following thesis: 
AMBITION. Beneficence requires an impressive altruist like Amy not to be 
content with how much she is giving, but to ambitiously increase how 
much she sacrifices. 
This thesis will consequently appeal to those of us who think that a virtuous person like 
Amy has moral insight [Hale 1991; Kawall 2009; Carbonell 2012]. 
 However, many of us are also inclined to judge that Amy is doing well, and hence we 
feel pulled towards another thesis: 
MODERATION. Beneficence is not so demanding that an impressive altruist 
like Amy is failing to sacrifice enough of her resources to help people in 
need. 
Our reasons for limiting beneficence’s demands are familiar.  With Barbara Herman 1
[2007: 108], we think that there are limits to how difficult beneficence can be given that 
‘a reasonable morality is well integrated into ordinary living, not something we are 
endlessly at war with (like a diet) or a distant goal toward which we direct substantial 
amounts of our energy’. With Susan Wolf [1982: 420], we think that there is a limit to 
how suffocating beneficence can be of our other worthwhile interests, such as ‘the 
 Some retort that our intuitions in favor of moderation are unreliable [Braddock 2013], or only support 1
abstract principles that are consistent with extreme demands of beneficence [Berkey 2016].
enjoyment of material comforts,’ engaging in ‘the intellectual and physical activities of 
our choice,’ and ‘the love, respect and companionship’.   2
 But a moderate view of beneficence seems to preclude Amy from being required to 
be ambitious. If Amy is already doing enough, then how could she be required to aim 
for more? For example, if Amy were merely required to give away some quota of her 
resources, then it would be supererogatory for her to give more than this amount.  On 3
the other hand, if Amy is required to sacrifice more, then how could it not be that she is 
failing to meet beneficence’s demands? For example, if we were to accept a demanding 
view of beneficence [Singer 1972; Kagan 1989; Cummiskey 1996; Unger 1996; Goodin 
2009; Sin 2010], then we would conclude that Amy is falling short. So while AMBITION 
and MODERATION are both attractive, they are in tension. Of course, we should not be 
surprised by the fact that two opposing moral views both have something going for 
them. This is the hallmark of robust philosophical debates about morality. But we 
should think that there is more at stake with this particular tension when we reflect on 
the phenomenology of Amy’s experience. A morally decent person like Amy can 
experience herself as compelled to sacrifice more, without thereby needing to feel guilty 
 For a response to Wolf that defends the lives of some actual saints, see Adams [1984]. Along similar lines 2
to Wolf, Bernard Williams objects that utilitarianism inadequately values both moral integrity [Williams 
1973] and our personal projects [Williams 1981]. Elizabeth Ashford [2000] responds that moral integrity 
can require demanding obligations, while Sarah Buss [2006] replies that we can rationally reconsider our 
projects in light of others’ needs.
 This could be a universal quota [Urmson 1958: 70, 71] or a quota fixed by everyone’s fair shares 3
[Murphy 2003]. For examples of non-quota moderate views, see Hooker [2000]; Cullity [2004]; Miller 
[2004]; Arneson [2004] which discusses Hampton [1993] and Scheffler [1994]; Noggle [2009]. For 
criticism of Cullity [2004], see Sonderholm [2015].
for how much she has been sacrificing. This does not seem to be a morally confused 
outlook. Instead, it has at least some prima facie plausibility as the correct view for us to 
adopt.  
 Reconciling AMBITION and MODERATION is the puzzle that I aim to address.  My 4
solution will involve defending a dynamic view of beneficence, which frames the 
relevant, central questions as concerning what pattern our altruism is required to take 
over time. Within this framework, I will argue that we are required to develop morally, 
and increase our sacrifices as we do. This type of dynamic view of beneficence has been 
defended on the Aristotelian eudaimonist grounds that we have reasons to develop, in 
order to aim at our own flourishing as virtuous people [Flescher 2003].  By contrast, I 5
will argue that the developmental requirement has an instrumental rationale: our 
reasons to develop morally derive from our goal of doing more to help people in need. 
However, the developmental view does not provide a full account of beneficence’s 
demands, until we add a static requirement that we give a bare minimum, regardless of 
how morally developed we are. So the final view of beneficence that we are left with is 
variegated, combining a multiplicity of dynamic and static requirements. 
2. Dynamic Beneficence 
Much of contemporary ethics is fruitfully investigated statically, by considering what we 
should do at a time. For example, to discover which actions are right, it is helpful to 
 It has some similarities to Vanessa Carbonell's [2012: 231] puzzle based on the fact that ‘[m]oral saints 4
habitually perform actions that are, intuitively, beyond moral obligation. Yet the moral saints sometimes 
consider these actions to be obligatory, not supererogatory.’ Carbonell's solution is that these saints are 
mistaking their sacrifices as obligatory, but they provide us with evidence of what we can reasonably 
demand of each other, and hence ‘ratchet up’ how much we must to sacrifice.
 This was brought to my attention after completing the substance of this essay. 
consider our intuitions about cases in which agents must act at particular moments. But 
in addition to knowing which actions are right in specific circumstances, we should also 
like to know which courses our lives ought to take. This requires investigating ethics 
dynamically, by considering what we should do over time. For example, the question of 
how to reconcile one’s career with one’s family only atypically concerns which specific 
actions to perform. Instead, it is primarily a matter of how to structure the course of 
one’s life while giving due regard to both concerns. The same is true of beneficence. 
Outside of acute emergencies, the key ethical questions typically concern how to plan 
one’s life. 
 A dynamic view of beneficence helps us understand an altruistic ambition like 
Amy’s. If we are in the grip of a static view, and limit our focus to agents’ obligations in 
particular cases, then judging that Amy ought to give more will pressure us into 
concluding that she is not giving enough. But once we think of beneficence as having a 
temporal profile, we can distinguish what Amy must do now from what she must do in 
the future. We can see the AMBITION thesis as capturing the fact that Amy is required to 
increase her sacrifice over time. This leaves room for the MODERATION thesis, as we can 
say that Amy is currently sacrificing as much as she is required. 
 But freeing up theoretical space is one thing; providing good reasons to occupy it, 
another. How could Amy increase her sacrifice without this being excessively difficult, 
or suffocating her other worthwhile interests? The answer also lies in a dynamic view of 
beneficence. When we think about beneficence diachronically, we need not take our 
characters, abilities or interests as fixed. Instead, someone like Amy can change them to 
bring her altruism and self-interest into a closer harmony. Indeed, I propose that she 
would be required to do so, and increase how much she sacrifices. In saying that she is 
required, I mean that all things considered she has most reason to do so, and that it 
would be blameworthy for her not to do so (although it may be that this blame can only 
be voiced by those who have themselves met the requirement in question). 
 Framing this proposal in terms of a requirement may seem unduly tendentious. 
After all, there are less controversial claims that we can make about Amy. For example, 
we can clearly say that Amy has moral reasons to develop herself and sacrifice more; 
moreover, we can say that since Amy is an impressive altruist with a particular tendency 
to act on moral reasons, we could also expect her to do more and hope that she does; in 
addition, we can say that she would be a better person for doing so, and come closer to a 
virtuous ideal. Given that we have this rich array of moral claims with which to 
characterise Amy’s situation, why invoke duty and hold that she is required to improve 
herself and increase her sacrifice?  Why not instead say that developing and increasing 6
her sacrifice would be supererogatory — something that would be morally good of her 
to do, but not required? 
 In general, whether an option is required or merely supererogatory turns on how the 
moral reasons for the option stack up against non-moral reasons for alternatives. 
Whenever we have an opportunity to help others, we have some moral reason to do so. 
This explains our general requirement to provide aid at no cost or negligible cost. Of 
course, some of these moral reasons can be fairly weak. The fact that Amy could delight 
a child sitting next to her on a plane with a story provides her with only a weak reason 
for action, and one that is easily outweighed by Amy’s inclination not to do so. But the 
reason’s weakness is grounded partly in the fact that a story is a trivial benefit. Not so, 
when it comes to providing basic necessities like water, food, protection from disease 
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for articulating this objection.6
and violence, education, and shelter. People’s urgent needs for these essentials give us 
powerful moral reasons for alleviating them, when possible, even when we stand in no 
special relation to these people.  To invoke an image of Sarah Buss’s [2006: 380], if an 7
affluent person like Amy is to stand up in front of a crowd of desperately needy people, 
then she had better have a powerful justification for failing to bring them succour. In 
the absence of such a justification, she would, all things considered, have most reason to 
help them, and it would be blameworthy in her not to do so. In other words, she would 
be required to do so. 
 We have encountered two plausible candidates for considerations that could provide 
this justification. The first was Herman’s point that beneficence should not require so 
much that meeting its requirements is excessively difficult. The second was Wolf’s point 
that beneficence should not be so suffocating that Amy is left with insufficient room for 
other worthwhile interests. In exploring a moderate view of beneficence, I am assuming 
that both Herman’s and Wolf’s considerations are sufficiently weighty that they can 
counterbalance Amy’s moral reasons to do more to help others. But crucially, on this 
moderate view, the demands of beneficence result from two competing pressures: the 
moral pressure generated by others’ urgent needs, and the countervailing pressure 
generated by the agent’s legitimate concerns with her own life, experiences, and agency. 
When there is no opposition from considerations of difficulty or suffocation, the needs 
 These needs’ moral significance is reflected in the fact that they allow strangers to make defeasible 7
claims on us, when they address us from the ‘second-personal standpoint’ [Darwall 2006]. Along these 
lines, Kate Manne [forthcoming] argues that just as our own needs play an imperatival role in our own 
first-personal decision-making, others’ needs play an imperatival role in terms of the second-personal 
reasons they give us.
of others win out: the corresponding moral reasons generate moral requirements for 
someone like Amy. 
 What this means is that if Amy can direct the course of her life in a way that allows 
her to do more to alleviate people’s needs, without this coming at the expense of her 
leading a manageable life based around interests that appeal to her, then she is required 
to do so. Suppose that this can be achieved through a combination of moral 
development and a concomitant increase in her sacrifice. Assuming that is possible—
and I will shortly give reasons for thinking that often it is possible—others’ needs 
generate an instrumental rationale for a duty to chart this path:  Amy ought to develop 8
 This beneficence-based rationale contrasts with—but need not compete with—other rationales for 8
moral development. On an Aristotelian eudaemonist view, we ought to develop virtuous states of 
character as ends that are valuable both for their own sake and as constituents of our ultimate end of 
flourishing [Aristotle 1999; Flescher 2003]. By contrast, a beneficence-based rationale for moral 
development focuses on others’ needs rather than our own flourishing, and has an instrumental structure: 
we are required to develop morally as a causal means to helping others. In its instrumentality, the 
beneficence-based rationale is similar to Kant’s rationale for an imperfect duty to perfect ourselves 
morally: Kant held that we ought to develop morally in order to act from the motive of duty. But while 
Kant’s duty of moral development is one that we owe to ourselves and is grounded in his view that the 
motive behind an act determines its moral worth [Baron 1987: 249; Wood 2009], my beneficence-based 
duty is owed to others for the sake of alleviating their needs. In addition, personal development can 
feature elsewhere in Kantian ethics. For example, Katja Vogt [2008] argues that Kant’s duty to develop 
one’s talents delineates duties of beneficence owed to others. Meanwhile, Robert Johnson [2011] argues 
that we have duties to develop ourselves in non-moral respects, which do not derive from a duty aimed at 
improving our moral selves.
morally at a moderate pace in order to help others more, while still leading a good life 
herself.  9
3. Moral Development that Enables Altruism 
That was to put the proposal programmatically. To fill in the details, we must ask how 
moral development can enable altruism. The answer is complicated by the fact that 
Herman and Wolf identify separate reasons for moderation. To make our inquiry more 
tractable, let us split it into two parts that address Herman’s and Wolf’s points 
respectively.  
 If we start with Herman’s point that beneficence should not be excessively difficult 
for most of us, then we should look for ways to make altruism easier. The first way to do 
so is by forming appropriate habits. Habituation’s role in building character is an 
insight of Aristotle, who claims that 
what we do in our dealings with other people makes some of us just, some 
unjust; what we do in terrifying situations, and the habits of fear or 
confidence that we acquire, make some of us brave and others 
cowardly… To sum it up in a single account: a state of character results 
from the repetition of similar activities  
[Aristotle 1999: 1103b14–1103b22]. 
 The requisite rate will be determined by the same two pressures. Others’ needs will put pressure on us 9
to take any steps that allow us to do more to help others in the long run. This will be met by an opposing 
pressure from considerations of difficulty or the value of other interests. Just as moral heroics are not 
required in our sacrifices at any point in time, they are not required for changing ourselves over time.
On Aristotle’s view, by repeating actions we engrain dispositions to perform certain 
actions and feel certain emotions in certain situations.  This is an ancient doctrine but 10
one supported by the picture of habituation emerging from the psychology literature on 
automaticity [Hassin, Uleman, and Bargh 2005]. By repeating actions in response to 
environmental cues, we come to make these responses automatic. In this way, ‘habits 
are learned dispositions to repeat past responses. They are triggered by features of the 
context that have covaried frequently with past performance’ [Wood and Neal 2007: 
843]. Once we have these dispositions, we need not engage in conscious, effortful 
decision-making to perform these actions. Instead, our actions are triggered directly by 
these cues. 
Which dispositions would be helpful? The most obvious are habits of helping 
others. The more that we perform altruistic actions unthinkingly, the less mental effort 
we expend in doing so. In addition, we can develop habits of empathising with others.  11
Psychologist Daniel Batson claims that ‘perceiving the other’s need . . . lead[s] to a 
unique internal response: a feeling of empathy . . . This unique emotional response to 
perceived need is a result of the perceiver adopting the perspective of the person in 
need’ [Batson and Shaw 1991: 112]. (See also Hoffman [2000].) Batson completes his 
‘empathy-altruism hypothesis’ with the claim that this emotional response motivates 
pro-social behaviour. We can apply Batson’s insight to habituation. Our ability to 
 Situationists have critiqued Aristotle’s view of character as a stable and general disposition [Doris 10
2002]. We need follow Aristotle only in holding that we form behavioural and emotional dispositions to a 
significant extent. 
 These habits would be to empathise on action-guiding occasions. If someone constantly shares in others’ 11
suffering, then this would be costly to them. For discussion of obstacles to empathy and altruism, see 
Lichtenberg [2004].
empathise is increased the more that we know about, and pay attention to, others’ 
plights. Consequently, forming habits of inquiring into, and attending to, others’ plights 
would allow us to develop our powers of empathy. To illustrate the benefits both of 
habitual giving and of habitually attending to others’ needs, consider Meira. Meira was 
raised in a religious community, in which the children were all provided with a penny to 
put in a charity collecting can at communal celebrations. Meira has cut her ties with the 
community, but has kept the symbolic practice. Whenever she passes by someone asking 
for money, she always gives something, even if it is a small amount. Her reasons are that 
it ensures that she gives regularly and keeps her open to the needs of others, stopping 
her from turning a blind eye. 
Besides acquiring behavioural and affective dispositions, there is a second way to 
make altruism easier: developing our capacities for will-power. Kant puts this at the 
heart of his account of moral development. He conceives of developing morally as 
strengthening our ‘capacity… to overcome all opposing sensible desires’ [Kant 1785: 
200]. In more prosaic terms, we might refer to this as our ability to resist temptations. 
Kant singles out a key way of strengthening our will-power: ‘by practicing 
virtue’ [ibid.]. Again, this insight from yesteryear is lent support by contemporary 
psychology. Roy Baumeister’s research program into self-control has defended the view 
that it is analogous to a muscle: ‘not only does self-control show short-term fatigue 
effects like a muscle does, it also shows long-term improvement, just as a muscle gets 
stronger through exercise’ [Muraven and Baumeister 2000: 254]. (See also Holton 
[2006].) So just as a gym-rat can become more physically powerful by using her muscles 
to lift weights, so someone can increase her will-power by using it to resist temptation.  
Why would helpful habits and strong will-power facilitate giving more to help 
others? Partly, these make it more likely that we perform helpful actions and pay 
attention to others’ needs. Also, they would make altruism easier. Outside of the realm 
of conscious decision-making, performing habitual actions would not be so taxing. 
Similarly, if we have strong faculties of will-power, then it will be less strenuous to act 
contrary to other desires. By analogy, if someone has to make a conscious decision not to 
eat cheese at each meal, then this regimen may well be highly taxing. On the other hand, 
if she has engrained a habit of passing on post-prandial cheese, then refraining will be 
much less of an ordeal. Further, if the cheese-abstainer has strong will-power, then it 
will not be such a struggle to stick to her resolution, should the thought of cheese arise. 
In this way, habituation and strong will-power can help someone keep to a stricter diet 
without this upgrade being experienced as excessively difficult. The same is true of 
altruism. 
 Those forms of moral development work around Herman’s constraint that 
beneficence not be excessively difficult. Now let us turn to Wolf’s constraint that 
beneficence should leave room for other worthwhile interests. To work around this 
constraint, we can shape our interests over time. We acquire new interests while other 
interests fade away, and we often develop our interests into new forms. By directing 
these processes, we can better reconcile our altruism with our own flourishing. 
First, we can shape our interests towards less expensive forms.  We can come to 12
rely less on material comforts, and we can take cost into account when deciding which 
new activities to engage in. Typically, many different interests could appeal to us, and 
 Chiara Cordelli [manuscript] argues that we have a preventative duty to limit our expected costs of 12
complying with the demands of beneficence, and this requires us to choose less expensive interests.
life is too short to take an interest in all that is worthwhile. For example, on a Thailand 
holiday, we might choose whether to learn how to cook panaeng curry or learn how to 
scuba-dive. Both interests would be life-enriching, yet by choosing the former, we could 
free up resources with which to help others. This is not to suppose that our interests are 
infinitely malleable. For some people, expensive activities like scuba-diving will already 
be passions, and cannot easily be replaced with alternatives that would bring them the 
same joy. But others’ tastes are more flexible, and they can let expensive interests fall by 
the wayside, to be replaced by others. Indeed, many altruists gradually lose a taste for 
expensive pursuits when they reflect on the extent of material inequality. 
 As well as economising, we can develop interests into forms that benefit others. We 
often have this opportunity because many worthwhile interests have social dimensions, 
bringing people together in various ways. Consider Adam, a beefy soccer player with a 
shaven head—quite an intimidating proposal for opponents. This appearance turns out 
to be deceptive, as Adam is a big softie, who volunteers his time to promote youth sport 
among disadvantaged children in his neighbourhood. Adam has taken his passion for 
soccer, and developed it into a way of helping others. While enabling children to enjoy 
the sport, he gives them the opportunity to learn about cooperation, sportsmanship, and 
discipline. Crucially, Adam has found a way to help others that is not at the expense of 
having a good life built around interests that appeal to him. By all accounts, he seems to 
be positively thriving in his work with kids, and this altruism is built around something 
that marks him out as an individual—his love of soccer. His life is still coloured by his 
appreciation of one of the many forms of ‘personal excellence’ [Wolf 1982]. 
Opportunities like Adam’s are not unusual, since valuable activities often become 
available to successive generations through social interaction. With one’s own 
enjoyment of an activity, typically comes the chance to share this enjoyment with others. 
 Let us bring these points together. We have discovered a catholic list of forms of 
moral development: habituation, strengthening will-power, developing more economical 
interests, and developing more altruistic interests. The list’s diversity reflects the fact 
that our moral agency is underpinned by different faculties and the fact that its 
direction should take account of non-moral values. But the common thread to the list is 
that these forms of moral development allow us to sacrifice more of our resources to 
help others, without this sacrifice being excessively difficult or suffocating other 
worthwhile interests. 
 In light of our earlier argument, this leads us to the view that beneficence places on 
us two constraints. First, it pro tanto requires us to develop ourselves morally in these 
ways. Second, the more morally developed we are, the more that beneficence pro tanto 
requires us to give.  If we like, then we could think of these two requirements in terms 13
of an analogy with learning the high jump. At any particular jump, a novice athlete 
should aim to clear the bar. But she should also aim to improve over time, and raise the 
bar higher. Similarly, at any particular time, beneficence requires us to give a certain 
amount to help others, and also to develop morally. As we become better people, we 
should increase the amount that we sacrifice to help others. In the long run, the 
possibility of moral development allows us to marry ambition in altruism with a 
moderate view of beneficence. 
4. Variable and Fixed Requirements of Beneficence 
 These are only pro tanto requirements, since there may be countervailing considerations. For example, 13
if one’s child developed an expensive illness, then one might legitimately spend less on strangers.
Call the position that beneficence requires us to develop morally and increase how much 
we sacrifice the ‘developmental view’. It entails that beneficence’s demands will vary 
across times and persons. To see the temporal variation, note that as Amy develops 
morally, she will be required to give more than she was previously required. As such, 
her required sacrifice is indexed to stages of her moral development. To see the personal 
variation, suppose that Belinda is less morally developed than Amy, but this is solely 
because Belinda is younger. The developmental view would hold that Amy is required to 
give more than Belinda. Consequently, there is no one-size-fits-all account of 
beneficence’s demands. Instead, these vary according to each individual’s 
circumstances, including her stage of moral development. 
 In one light, this variation might look objectionable. It might seem more fair if 
everyone were required to sacrifice a uniform amount. Indeed, the grounds for the lack 
of uniformity may appear particularly unfair, since Amy is required to give more 
precisely because she is the better person. Thus, morality seems to ask more of Amy for 
becoming a morally better person, while Belinda is let off the hook for being less 
virtuous. This might remind us of the unfairness that occurs when dependable 
colleagues are saddled with tasks, while irresponsible colleagues are not. 
 However, we should resist seeing Amy as penalised for her moral development. We 
need to pay attention to how each person experiences her sacrifices. As a more 
developed moral agent, Amy would be required to sacrifice more of her time, money, 
and effort than Belinda. But this sacrifice would not be more arduous or more 
constrictive of her own interests. Having developed, Amy finds it easier to make 
sacrifices, and can do more good while pursuing her own interests. In effect, Amy’s 
moral development has created a ‘moral surplus’ that she could distribute in two ways. 
First, she could be the one to receive the benefits: as the result of her development, she is 
entitled to keep her level of sacrifice constant, and lead an easier life that allows her to 
enjoy her interests more. Second, people in need could receive the benefits of her moral 
development: she could increase her sacrifice, without making altruism any more 
difficult or suffocating for her. On the second approach, Amy is at no net loss compared 
to where she was before developing. The developmental view makes the second 
approach compulsory, on the grounds that others’ needs make Amy required to develop 
morally. 
 Those conclusions follow because we assumed that Amy is more morally developed 
than Belinda simply because she is older. But what should we say about the sacrifice of 
Clara who has persisted with comparatively expensive interests despite having the 
opportunity to develop more economical interests? If we assume that the only difference 
between Amy and Clara is that only Amy has fully met the requirement to develop 
morally, then how do their required sacrifices compare?  
 Consider the counterfactual scenario in which Clara had cultivated more frugal 
interests. Then, Clara could live a good life by enjoying these frugal interests. With the 
resources that she saves, she could help a certain number of people to a certain degree. 
(Clara would produce a ‘certain amount of good’.) In the actual world, Clara can still 
help these people in her uncultivated state. But this would come at the expense of 
pursuing the particular interests that she actually has, and so would involve a loss to 
her. Alternatively, Clara can pursue the particular interests that she actually has. But as 
a result Clara would do less to help others. (She would produce a ‘lesser amount of 
good’.) Thus, whichever option Clara takes, someone ends up paying a cost: either 
Clara fails to pursue her actual interests or other people’s needs go unmet. 
 I argue that Clara should bear this cost for the following reason. If a cost arises solely as 
the foreseeable result of someone culpably failing to meet a moral requirement, then all else 
equal the cost should be paid by that person. To illustrate, suppose Daniela has delayed 
booking her tickets for a holiday, and the prices have predictably risen. If the delay has 
foreseeably been caused by her companion’s negligence, then her companion ought to offer 
to pay the additional costs; but if the negligence is Daniela’s, then she ought to shoulder the 
costs herself. The underlying principle is that, all else equal, it is unfair for others to bear the 
costs of an agent’s culpable mistakes, when she could instead internalise these costs herself. 
In the case of Clara, she is the person at fault, and so in the absence of a valid excuse, Clara 
should be the one to pay the cost. 
 However, it may be that there are reasons why Clara should not be held fully responsible 
for her previous failure to develop morally. I want to highlight three potential reasons. First, 
Clara may have changed so much that she is no longer fully responsible for moral failures 
during her youth. Plausibly, certain forms of psychological continuity undergird the moral 
responsibility that we have for our past actions. So, the more that we change in these 
psychological respects, the less responsible that we would be. Second, Clara may have failed 
to appreciate that she has a duty to develop morally. If so, then her previous moral ignorance 
may be a partial excuse. In particular, moral ignorance may function as an excuse when the 
relevant moral truths are difficult to discover and are not yet widely shared in her moral 
community.  Accordingly, Clara might plead that her moral ignorance of the developmental 14
view was not mere negligence on her part; instead, it was an easy mistake to make, and one 
 For discussion of the relationship between oppressive social contexts and the responsibility of people 14
with objectionable moral views, see Calhoun [1989]; Moody-Adams [1994]; Isaacs [1997]. For discussion 
of whether moral ignorance is an excuse, see Rosen [2003]; Harman [2011]; Mason [2015].
that is widely made by others. Third, we might think that morality should be lenient towards 
people who turn over a new leaf. Suppose that Clara has undergone a moral epiphany, and 
only recently begun to appreciate that she was required to develop her interests. Now that she 
sees her obligations aright, she has fully resolved to do what she ought. While this change of 
heart does not absolve her of responsibility for her previous actions, we might think that it 
provides grounds for not holding her fully responsible for the costs that have resulted from 
her previous errors. We might think morality should leave room for making a fresh start. 
 While these considerations each have appeal, they raise issues that are not local to 
beneficence: these issues arise whenever we must decide whether to be lenient on people who 
have erred in the past.  I am unable to resolve these issues here, and so, I will leave open 15
whether they provide grounds for not holding people fully responsible for their past moral 
failures. Instead, I will only state the implications for beneficence, on the assumption that 
these considerations turn out be probative. It is in light of Clara’s previous failure to develop 
morally that her current sacrifice would increase to the level that would be required of her as 
a developed person. So, to the extent that Clara is excused from her previous failures to 
develop morally, she is not required to increase her sacrifice in this way.  On the other hand, 16
if Clara has no such excuse, then she is morally required to do as ‘much good’ as she would 
have done in the counterfactual scenario where she had met all her requirements. In other 
words, if Clara is fully responsible for failing to develop as much as Amy, and this is the only 
difference between them, then Clara is still required to sacrifice as much as Amy. 
 In addition, there is the question of whether we are required to sacrifice more to assist someone when 15
we have previously failed to assist that same person [Barry and Øverland 2014].
 It would matter whether the excuses are fully exculpatory or merely mitigating.16
 Of course, if Clara did sacrifice as much as Amy, then Clara would be foregoing some of 
her particular interests. Does this mean that we have lost sight of Wolf’s insight that 
beneficence should not be so demanding that we are unable to enjoy our particular interests? I 
suggest not. There is potency to the complaint that a moral theory is too demanding in virtue 
of the size of the costs that we would bear when meeting the theory’s requirements.  Much 17
less powerful is the complaint that a theory is too demanding in virtue of the additional costs 
that we would bear as a result of failing to meet our requirements. While Clara faces high 
moral demands, she cannot complain that beneficence is too demanding. After all, 
beneficence gave her the opportunity to continually pursue interests that appeal to her. To 
grasp this opportunity, she would have needed to develop her interests over time. But by 
failing to meet the requirement to develop morally, she failed to grasp this opportunity. That 
is why she now faces high demands. So we should attribute Clara’s need to make these 
additional sacrifices to her own failures. As a result, she cannot appeal to these additional 
sacrifices to complain that beneficence is too demanding. 
 So far, I have defended the developmental view, according to which beneficence’s 
demands depend on an individual’s stage of moral development. The developmental 
view posits two requirements. First, each individual is pro tanto required to realise her 
potential for developing morally at a moderate rate. Second, at each stage in her life, she 
is pro tanto required to make sacrifices that would be moderate, were she to have 
previously met her requirement to develop morally. Should we stop there and fully 
relativise all of beneficence’s demands to an individual’s potential to develop morally? 
 For recent collections of essays on the so-called demandingness objection, see Chappell [2009]; Van 17
Ackeren and Kühler [2016].
 While this would make our account of beneficence pleasingly unified, it comes at too 
great a cost: it leaves us with counterintuitive commitments with respect to abnormally 
undeveloped agents. Suppose that Edwina is a libertine, with stunted moral potential. 
She has limited self-control, and empathy, as she hedonistically lives for each present 
pleasure. Her interests are at best amoral, and at worst morally repugnant. In short, 
Edwina is in a state of moral disrepair, and consequently she finds even modest 
demands of beneficence difficult and restrictive. Holding a door for a stranger feels an 
excruciating waste of her time. Coughing up a few pounds for a charity collector 
directly interferes with her ambition to be as filthy rich as possible. Worse, Edwina has 
scant potential to improve herself. An unusual degree of selfishness is a fixed part of her 
character, regardless of whatever attempts she now makes to better herself. I take it that 
Edwina’s gross shortcomings do not absolve her from having to make sacrifices. When 
Herman and Wolf ask us to take seriously how altruism can be difficult and restrictive, 
they are advocating moderation in beneficence, not unfettered laxity. 
 The case of Edwina brings out the fact that we can expect a certain amount of 
sacrifice from everyone. As such, it motivates postulating a bare minimum requirement 
that all must meet, regardless of what they find difficult or restrictive, and regardless of 
their potential for development. There is room for further discussion as to the form that 
this requirement should take, but my inclination is towards a ‘minimally decent’ person 
standard [Thomson 1971]. A minimally decent person standard is somewhat vague, but 
this makes the standard flexible enough to take into account personal features, such as 
the amount of resources that each individual possesses. Still, a vague standard will still 
have determinate implications for clear cases of behaviour that falls below the standard. 
For example, since it would be indecent in Edwina to find holding the door difficult, this 
difficulty does not place a limit on what beneficence requires of her in this circumstance. 
But we would need to investigate fully the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative formulations of a bare minimum requirement, before settling on a minimal 
decency standard. In the absence of such an investigation, I only suggest it. 
 Regardless of whichever way that we end up formulating the bare minimum 
requirement, it provides a basic amount of sacrifice required of everyone. Consequently, 
a wholly person-variable approach to beneficence cannot be right. In addition, the bare 
minimum lacks a temporal profile, and is insensitive to someone’s stage in her moral 
development. Consequently, a wholly dynamic view of beneficence cannot be right. 
Instead, beneficence makes multiple demands of us, some static and some dynamic. The 
static, bare minimum requirement marks a floor for our sacrifices, while the dynamic, 
developmental requirements specify how far above this floor each of us must aim over 
time. In terms of our high-jump analogy, for even the most novice athlete, the bar has to 
be placed at a certain height. After all, someone is not engaging in the high jump, if she 
steps over a bar that is at ankle height. But the novice athlete should aim at developing 
her skill and raising the bar that she clears. Similarly, in altruism, there is a static 
threshold that everyone should aim to meet, but over time, everyone should develop as 
moral agents and exceed this threshold. 
 A similar position might be defended for other virtues besides beneficence.  We 18
have seen how beneficence provides an instrumental rationale for cultivating traits 
germane to helping others. It seems plausible that morality could provide us with 
analogous instrumental rationales for cultivating other traits. For example, take 
courage. There is a bare minimum of courage that can be expected of everyone when 
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.18
taking risks for moral ends. But the more courageous that we become, the more 
capacity that we have to perform morally good acts for which courage is an asset. For 
example, we have reasons to speak out against injustices, even when doing so risks our 
reputations, our relations with others or other interests of ours. For the sake of these 
reasons, morality might place on us a requirement to develop into more courageous 
people. In so far as this is an instrumental rationale for a developmental requirement, it 
would be analogous to the beneficence-based rationale for the developmental view. 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued for a view of beneficence that combines multiple requirements. There is a 
static requirement that specifies a bare minimum that everyone must meet. In addition, 
according to the developmental view, we are required to develop morally and increase 
how much we sacrifice as we do. These dynamic requirements allow us to solve the 
puzzle with which we began. Let us return to Amy. The developmental view implies that 
looking forward into the future, Amy ought to be ambitious about how much she gives
—she ought to aim to give more then. As such, Amy’s ambitious attitude is the correct 
one for her to take, and so we have validated the AMBITION thesis. Importantly, though, 
the developmental view allows us to hold that Amy is already giving what she ought 
now. As such, the view leaves room for the MODERATION thesis, on the grounds that 
beneficence’s demands should not be too difficult or suffocating. We can take these 
considerations into account as limits both on the rate at which Amy is required to 
develop and also on the sacrifices that she must make at each stage of her development. 
In this way, we can reconcile the AMBITION and MODERATION theses. We have arrived 
at a moderate view of beneficence, which finds a role for ambition. 
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